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Detect rather than block: a Red Team's perspective

In internal penetration tests, SSHack plays the employee who wants to take data out. Seen from that side, a block is first and foremost a piece of information. Here is why our offensive team recommends detecting first and keeping blocking for critical cases, with a real case from our engagements.

By the SSHack team · Published · about 7 minutes to read

Key takeaways

Against a deliberate data leak, discreet detection is often more useful than blocking: a block reveals the rule to the person behind the leak and pushes them to another channel, whereas detection leaves a trace they do not suspect. Ways around a block (a phone in MTP mode, an encrypted archive, webmail, a screenshot) are publicly documented, notably by MITRE ATT&CK. Blocking remains the right answer against honest mistakes and for data where no transfer at all is acceptable. Our recommendation: detect first, measure for a few weeks, then block only the critical cases.

What a denial teaches the attacker

When we simulate a malicious employee, our first goal is not to get a file out. It is to find out which controls are in place. A block gives us that map.

The USB drive that gets refused, the attachment that is held back, the warning that pops up in Outlook: each denial answers a precise question. Is this channel monitored? Does the rule read the content, or only the file extension? At what volume does it trigger? A block works like an oracle: you try, it answers yes or no, you adjust. In a few attempts, the rule is mapped out.

Vendors take this into account: Microsoft states in its Purview documentation that external senders only receive a generic notification, so as not to disclose anything about the DLP policy configuration. For internal users, on the other hand, the notification can detail the conditions that were triggered. That is by design, since it is meant to correct honest mistakes; but whoever wants to get around the rule reads it too.

A block also deters, and it would be dishonest to ignore that: faced with a denial, an employee who was just trying their luck may give up. A determined employee sees it as a signpost.

Publicly documented workarounds

None of what follows is secret. MITRE ATT&CK, the reference knowledge base on attack techniques, lists 10 exfiltration techniques in version 20, not counting those that prepare the transfer, such as archiving or screen capture.

What a block reveals, and the alternative route
What is blockedWhat the denial revealsDocumented alternative routePublic reference
Copying to a USB drive ("Removable Disks" Group Policy)USB storage is blockedA phone in file transfer mode (MTP), which Windows puts in a different device class ("WPD Devices"), configured separatelyATT&CK T1052, which mentions phones; Microsoft Removable Storage Access policies
A file containing a sensitive keywordThe rule reads the contentA password-protected archive, unreadable to the toolATT&CK T1560.001 (7-Zip, WinRAR)
A forbidden file typeThe rule is based on the formatRenaming the extension: useful against an extension filter, useless if the tool checks the real file type (Microsoft does so for Office and PDF)Microsoft Endpoint DLP documentation
A transfer above a certain sizeA threshold exists; a few attempts locate itSplitting the transfer into chunks below the thresholdATT&CK T1030
The attachment in the company email systemThis channel is inspectedPersonal webmail, cloud storage, another transfer protocolATT&CK T1567.002, T1048
Files, on every channelFiles are trackedPrinting, screenshots, a phone photo of the screenATT&CK T1113; printing is a separate activity in DLP tools

The common thread is that each workaround changes the channel or the form. As for screen capture, MITRE considers it hard to counter with preventive controls.

What discreet detection changes

Facing a tool that logs without blocking anything, the attacker gets no feedback. The copy goes through; nothing tells them it was seen. So they have no reason to leave the easiest route, which is precisely the one you are watching. Blocking moves the leak to your blind spots; detection keeps it on the channels you can see.

Detection also leaves time to reconstruct the facts, bring in HR and a lawyer, and then act (see our first-48-hours protocol, in French). Without a dedicated tool, Windows records the drive that was plugged in, not the list of files copied, unless auditing was turned on beforehand (see our guide on files copied to a USB drive). This trace matters most around departures, a high-risk period, as our insider data leak statistics (in French) show.

Discreet does not mean secret. CISA, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, classifies DLP among detection tools; it recommends telling employees that activity is monitored, while keeping case management confidential to protect the sources and methods of the team in charge. In France, prior notice is a legal obligation (article L1222-4 of the French Labor Code) and the CNIL (France's data protection authority) requires the system to be proportionate; check the equivalent rules in your own country. Employees therefore know that data transfers are logged, without knowing the alert rules. That asymmetry is enough, as one of our engagements shows.

From the field

During a digital forensics engagement, Stealint, our platform that monitors data leaks on cybercriminal platforms, spotted the client's data exposed on the dark web through its "Intelligence Feed" feature. There was no sign of an infostealer leak (malware that steals credentials and files from an infected device): the data was not coming from a compromised device. The client had doubts about one employee, but nothing showed who was taking the data out, or through which channel.

The client updated its information security policy, signed by all employees, and we then installed VigiDoc on the endpoints. The rules were written and signed; the detection, on the other hand, was not visible day to day. A few months later, leaks continued to show up on the dark web. This time, VigiDoc had logged the transfer: an employee in conflict with HR was taking the data out on a USB drive. VigiDoc did not stop the leak; it revealed who was taking the data out, and through which channel.

Blocking USB drives as soon as the first suspicions arose would probably have cut off that channel. The denial would most likely also have told this person that USB drives were being controlled and pushed them toward another route: the leaks would probably have continued, with no name and no channel to explain them.

When blocking is the right call

We are not arguing for removing all blocking. Three situations justify it.

Our recommendation, already set out in our guide on detection and blocking in DLP software: detect first, measure the real data flows for a few weeks, then block only the critical cases while keeping detection everywhere else. For USB drives, our guide "Block or monitor USB drives?" offers a decision tree.

VigiDoc's choice: log without blocking anything

VigiDoc, SSHack's DLP software for Windows endpoints, follows this reasoning: it does not block any transfer. It logs copies to USB drives or external disks, Outlook emails and their attachments, attachments added in Gmail and Outlook on the web, and the web pages visited, and raises an alert in its Dashboard when a sensitive keyword appears. An encrypted copy of the files that left by USB drive or email stays on your server; users work as usual.

We prefer to be upfront about its blind spots: printing, screenshots, a phone in MTP mode, text typed into webmail, attachments in webmail services other than Gmail and Outlook on the web (only the page visit shows up), and the contents of password-protected archives (only the fact that they left is logged). All the more reason not to push the person behind a leak toward those routes with a visible denial.

Frequently asked questions

Does a DLP that doesn't block let data leave?

Yes, the transfer goes through: that is the deliberate trade-off. In return, the transfer is logged, the analyst is alerted and, depending on the tool, a copy of the file is kept for the investigation. For data where no transfer at all is acceptable, a targeted block remains the right answer.

Is discreet detection the same as covert surveillance?

No. In France, for example, employees must be informed beforehand of any system that collects information about them (article L1222-4 of the French Labor Code), the CNIL (France's data protection authority) requires the system to be proportionate, and companies with 50 or more employees must also consult their works council (CSE). Employees therefore know that data transfers are logged; only the alert rules are not shown to them. Rules vary by country: check your local employment law, and consult a lawyer for a specific case.

Company data is circulating on the dark web: how do you know if the leak comes from inside?

First, rule out a device infected by an infostealer, a type of malware that steals credentials and files. After that, finding out who is taking the data out, and through which channel, usually requires traces collected on the endpoints. On one SSHack engagement, it was VigiDoc, installed after the first suspicions, that logged the data leaving on a USB drive a few months later and made it possible to identify the employee involved.

Where to start: detection or blocking?

With detection, for a few weeks, to measure the real data flows and tune the rules without getting in the way of work. Microsoft itself advises testing every new DLP rule in simulation mode before enforcing it. Once false positives are under control, block the critical cases and keep detection on everything else.

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